Events
The immovables belonging to the applicant, who is a community foundation, were expropriated by the municipality for the purpose of road construction, some partially, some completely. However, after the expropriation process, it was not possible to use the said immovables as a road because it was determined that they were within the boundaries of the urban protected area. No result could be obtained from the applications made by the municipality, which carried out the expropriation process, to the Conservation Board several times, and the road works in the said region could not be started as of the date of the individual application. Therefore, the use of the immovables as roads was not in question.
Although the civil court of first instance rejected the lawsuit on the grounds of time-out in the title deed cancellation and registration lawsuit filed by the applicant within the scope of the exercise of the right to return, the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal request by examining the merits of the case. The Court of Cassation accepted that all of the applications made by the municipality to the Protection Board and the decisions of the council were in the nature of a transaction for the purpose of expropriation, and concluded that the conditions for the return of the immovables were not met. The applicant’s request for rectification was also rejected by the Supreme Court.
allegations
The applicant claimed that his property right was violated because the unused immovable was not returned for the purpose of expropriation.
Court’s Evaluation
Making legal actions and dispositions against the expropriated immovables for the purpose of public interest and not using these immovables for the purpose of public interest after a reasonable period of time constitutes a disproportionate interference with the right to property. Accordingly, the fact that the expropriated immovable is not allocated for the purpose of public interest causes the owner of the property not to benefit from the surplus value created by the property in the intervening period, and the fact that the immovable is not expropriated over its actual value.
In the concrete case, the immovables expropriated by the municipality were not used for the purpose of expropriation, nor were they allocated for any other purpose for public benefit. In the approval decision of the Court of Cassation, it was accepted that the correspondence of the municipality with the Conservation Board for the use of the immovables in line with the public interest, and it was accepted that the conditions for return were not met, by stating that the immovables were used for the purpose of expropriation, but when the documents in the file and submitted to the Civil Court of First Instance during the proceedings in the court of instance were examined, no steps were taken to use the immovables as roads. was not found to be discarded. In fact, it has been understood from the decisions of the Protection Board that it is not possible to widen the road in the region where the immovables are located.
However, it has not been claimed that the expropriated immovables were allocated for a purpose other than roads. In these circumstances, it has been evaluated that it is not possible to accept the correspondence made by the municipality and the decisions of the Protection Board as a transaction established in line with the expropriation purpose of the immovables.
On the other hand, the fact that correspondence has been made and is being made with the Conservation Board regarding the immovables does not constitute a justification for the continuation of keeping the immovables, which are understood to have legal obstacles in front of their use for the purpose of expropriation, in a very short time after the date of expropriation, without allocating them for the purpose of public interest. Public authorities are obliged to act in accordance with the purpose of expropriation or the public interest within a period that can be considered reasonable for each immovable they expropriated. Otherwise, some of the immovables subject to the expropriation procedures will be prevented from being used in accordance with the expropriation purpose or public interest, and it will be inevitable that these immovables are transferred for the sole purpose of generating income.
As a result, it is clear that the applicant’s immovables have not been used for any other purpose, suitable for expropriation or beneficial to the public, since the date of expropriation. In this context, considering the length of time that has elapsed since the expropriation date and the increase in the value of the said immovables during this period, it has been evaluated that the applicant was deprived of the surplus value created by the property and that the immovables were not returned. Therefore, despite the fact that twenty years have passed until the date of the lawsuit, in the concrete case, the purpose of public interest was not realized because the immovables were not used for expropriation purposes, and considering the increase in the value of the immovables during this period, it was seen that the expropriation price paid to the applicant was far from reflecting the real value of the immovable. It has been concluded that the applicant has imposed an excessive and extraordinary burden on the applicant, and that the fair balance between the public interest and the protection of the applicant’s property right has been disturbed against the applicant.
The Constitutional Court decided that the right to property had been violated for the reasons explained.